Thinking, Reasoning, and Decision Making in Autism

Kinga Morsanyi and I have co-edited a book on “Thinking, Reasoning, and Decision Making in Autism“, published by Routledge this week.

 

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Byrne & Johnson-Laird 2019

Are judgments of the truth and probability of a counterfactual such as “if the wine had been Italian it would have been red” affected by a few Italian white wines on the wine list? Our experiments in the Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition are out now – “If and or: Real and counterfactual possibilities in their truth and probability”.

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IJCAI 2019, Macau, China

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Ruth Byrne gave a talk on “Counterfactuals in Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI): Evidence from Human Reasoning” in the survey track of  IJCAI 2019, the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, on 14th August, in Macau, China. The paper in the proceedings is available here.

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Explainable AI at IJCAI, Macau, China

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Ruth Byrne gave the Keynote talk on “Constraints on Counterfactuals” at the Explainable Artificial Intelligence Workshop at IJCAI 2019 the International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, in Macau, China, on 11th August. The program is available here and the keynote slides are here.

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Visit by Phil Johnson-Laird

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Phil Johnson-Laird (Princeton University and New York University) visited in August –  beginning a new project on reasoning from counterfactual conditionals about possibilities and certainties in collaboration with Ruth Byrne and Orlando Espino.

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Welcome to Prof Orlando Espino

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Welcome to Orlando Espino, from the University of La Laguna, Tenerife, Spain, who will be visiting the lab from July to December 2019, to carry out experiments on how people reason from counterfactual conditionals.

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Non categorical thought

 

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Arif Ahmed organised a very interesting meeting on non-categorical thought in the Faculty of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge – the program is here.

 

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AI and Cognitive Science Conference, Dublin

Looking forward to the AICS 2018 conference this week!

 

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Welcome to Beyza Tepe

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Beyza Tepe is visiting the lab for six months to do research on moral judgment. Beyza is carrying out a PhD in the University of Istanbul in Turkey.

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Orlando Espino visits lab

Dr Orlando Espino from the University of La Laguna, Tenerife is visiitng the lab and will give a talk next Tuesday on reasoning from negated conditionals.

Our article on counterfactual reasoning in Cognitive Science has been published this month:

Espino, O. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2018). Thinking about the opposite of what is said: counterfactual conditionals and symbolic or alternate simulations of negation. Cognitive Science. DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12677

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The abstract is as follows:

“When people understand a counterfactual such as “if the flowers had been roses, the trees would have been orange trees,” they think about the conjecture, “there were roses and orange trees,” and they also think about its opposite, the presupposed facts. We test whether people think about the opposite by representing alternates, for example, “poppies and apple trees,” or whether models can contain symbols, for example, “no roses and no orange trees.” We report the discovery of an inference-to-alternates effect—a tendency to make an affirmative inference that refers to an alternate even from a negative minor premise, for example, “there were no orange trees, therefore there were poppies.” Nine experiments show the inference-to-alternates effect occurs in a binary context, but not a multiple context, and for direct and indirect reference; it can be induced and reduced by prior experience with similar inferences, and it also occurs for indicative conditionals. The results have implications for theories of counterfactual conditionals, and of negation.”

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