2022
Dai, X., Keane, M.T., Shalloo, L., Ruelle, E., & Byrne, R.M.J. (2022). Counterfactual explanations for prediction and diagnosis in XAI. Proceedings of the AIES conference, AIES’22. Oxford, UK. pdf
Warren, G., Keane, M.T. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2022). Features of explainability: how users understand counterfactual and causal explanations for categorical and continuous features in XAI. Cognitive Aspects of Knowledge Representation Workshop, IJCAI-22. pdf
Tepe, B., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2022). Cognitive processes in imaginative moral shifts: How judgments of morally unacceptable actions change. Memory & Cognition, 50, 1103-1123. pdf
Orenes, I., Espino O., & Byrne, R.M.J. (2022). Similarities and Differences in Understanding Negative and Affirmative Counterfactuals and Causal Assertions: Evidence from Eye-Tracking. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 75, 4, 633-651. pdf
2021
Byrne, R.M.J. (2021). Looking forward, looking back: Imaginative Cognition in Jack B. Yeats’s Paintings. In B. Rooney & D. Maguire (Eds). Jack B. Yeats: Painting and Memory. National Gallery of Ireland Press. pp. 24-31. pdf
Byrne, R.M.J. & Espino, O. (2021). Counterfactuals and conditional reasoning. In M. Knauff & W. Spohn (Eds). Handbook of Rationality. Cambridge: MIT press. pp. 405-418.
Pighin, S., Byrne, R.M.J., & Tentori, K. (2021). “If Only” Counterfactual Thoughts about Cooperative and Uncooperative Decisions in Social Dilemmas. Thinking & Reasoning. https://doi.org/10.1080/13546783.2021.1961859
Espino, O., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2021). How people keep track of what is real and what is imagined: The epistemic status of counterfactual alternatives to reality. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 47(4), 547–570. https://doi.org/10.1037/xlm0000965
2020
Espino,O., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2020). The suppression of inferences from counterfactual conditionals. Cognitive Science, 44(4). pdf
Espino, O., Byrne, R. M., J. & Johnson-Laird, P. N. (2020). Possibilities and the parallel meanings of factual and counterfactual conditionals. Memory & Cognition. pdf
Byrne, R.M.J. (2020). The Counterfactual Imagination: The Impact of Alternatives to Reality on Morality. In A. Abraham (Ed). Cambridge Handbook of the Imagination. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
2019
Timmons, S., Gubbins, E., Almeida, T. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2019). Imagined alternatives to episodic memories of morally good acts. Journal of Positive Psychology, 16(2), 178-197. pdf
Byrne, R.M.J. (2019). Counterfactuals in explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI): Evidence from Human Reasoning. Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence. p. 6276-6282. pdf
Byrne. R.M.J. & Johnson-Laird, P.N. (2019). If and or: real and counterfactual possibilities in their truth and probability. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition. 46 (4), 760-780. pdf
Orenes, I., García Madruga, J.A.,Gómez-Veiga, I., Espino, O. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2019) The comprehension of counterfactual conditionals: evidence from eye-tracking in the visual world paradigm. Frontiers in Psychology. 10, 1172. pdf
Morsanyi, K. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2019). Thinking, reasoning, and decision-making in autism. London: Routledge. pp.184.
Morsanyi, K. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2019). How do individuals with autism think? In K. Morsanyi & R.M.J. Byrne (Eds). Thinking, reasoning, and decision-making in autism. London: Routledge. pp. 1-12.
Rasga, C., Quelhas, A.C. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2019). Counterfactual and false-belief reasoning in individuals with autism. In K. Morsanyi & R.M.J. Byrne (Eds). Thinking, reasoning, and decision-making in autism. London: Routledge. pp. 88-112.
2018
Espino, O. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2018). Thinking about the opposite of what is said: counterfactual conditionals and symbolic or alternate simulations of negation. Cognitive Science. 42(8), 2459-2501 pdf
Khemlani, S., Johnson-Laird, P.N., & Byrne, R.M.J. (2018). Facts and possibilities: A model-based theory of sentential reasoning. Cognitive Science. 42, 6, 1887-1924.pdf
Timmons, S. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2018). Moral Fatigue: The Effects of Cognitive Fatigue on Moral Reasoning. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 72, 4, 943-954. pdf
Byrne, R.M.J. & Timmons, S. (2018). Moral hindsight for good actions and the effects of imagined alternatives to reality. Cognition. 178, 82-91 pdf
Parkinson, M. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2018). Judgments of moral responsibility and wrongness for intentional and accidental harm and purity violations. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 71, 3, 779-789. pdf
Moreno-Rios, S., & Byrne, R.M.J. (2018). Inferences from disclosures about the truth and falsity of expert testimony. Thinking and Reasoning. 24, 1, 41-78 pdf
Byrne, R.M.J. (2018). Counterfactual reasoning and imagination. In L.J. Ball & V.A. Thompson (Eds.). International Handbook of Thinking and Reasoning. London: Routledge. pp71-87.
2017
Byrne, R.M.J. (2017). Counterfactual thinking: From logic to morality, Current Directions in Psychological Science, 26, 4, 314 – 322 pdf
Parkinson, M. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2017). Counterfactual and semifactual thoughts in moral judgments about failed attempts to harm. Thinking and Reasoning. 23, 4, 409-448.pdf
Parkinson, M. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2017). Moral Judgments of Risky Choices: A Moral Echoing Effect. Judgment and Decision Making, 12, 3, 236-252. pdf
Rasga, C., Quelhas, A.C., & Byrne, R.M.J. (2017). How children with autism reason about other’s intentions: False belief and counterfactual inferences. Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 47, 1806-1817. pdf
Couto, C., Quelhas, A.C., & Byrne, R.M.J. (2017). Advice conditionals about tips and warnings:interpretations and inferences. Journal of Cognitive Psychology. 29, 3, 364-380. pdf
2016
Rasga, C., Quelhas, A. C., & Byrne, R. M. (2016). Children’s reasoning about other’s intentions: False-belief and counterfactual conditional inferences. Cognitive Development, 40, 46-59. pdf
Byrne, R.M.J. (2016). Counterfactual Thought. Annual Review of Psychology. 67, 135–57 pdf
Byrne, R.M.J. (2016). Counterfactual thinking. In A. Kind (ed). The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Imagination. London: Routledge. Pp.339-352.
2015
Juhos, C., Quelhas, A.C. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2015). Reasoning about intentions: Counterexamples to reasons for actions. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory & Cognition. 41, 1, 55-76. pdf
Byrne, R. M.J. (2015). Mental models. In R. Scott & S. Kosslyn(Eds). Emerging Trends in the Social and Behavioral Sciences. New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons. Pp. 1-13.
2014
Gubbins, E., & Byrne, R. M. (2014). Dual processes of emotion and reason in judgments about moral dilemmas. Thinking & Reasoning. 20 (2), 245-268.pdf
2013
Espino, O. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2013). The Compatibility Heuristic in Non-Categorical Hypothetical Reasoning: Inferences Between Conditionals And Disjunctions. Cognitive Psychology. 67, 3, 98-129. pdf
Murray, M.A. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2013). Cognitive Change in Insight Problem-Solving: Initial Model Errors and Counterexamples. Journal of Cognitive Psychology. 25, 2, 210-219.pdf
Byrne, R. M.J. (2013). Counterfactual Reasoning. In D.S. Dunn (Ed). Oxford Bibliographies in Psychology. New York: Oxford University Press.
Nduibuisi, B. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2013). Intentionality and choice. In M. Knauff, M., Pauen, N., Sebanz, & I. Wachsmuth (Eds.) Proceedings of the 35th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp. 1970-1975). Austin TX: Cognitive Science Society.pdf
Meehan, J. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2013). The development of the rational imagination. In Barouillet, P. & Gauffroy, C. (eds). The Development of Thinking Hove: Psychology Press. Pp. 34-48.
2012
Frosch, C. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2012). Causal conditionals and counterfactuals. Acta Psychologica. 141 , (1 ), 54 – 66 pdf
Pereda, A., Garavan, H. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2012). Switching attention incurs a cost for counterfactual conditional inferences. Irish Journal of Psychology. 33, (2-3), 72 – 77 pdf
Egan, S. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2012). Inferences from counterfactual threats and promises. Experimental Psychology. 59, (4), 227 – 235 pdf
Johnson-Laird, P.N., & Lotstein, M. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2012). The consistency of disjunctive assertions. Memory and Cognition, 40, 769-778. pdf
Espino, O. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2012). It is not the case that if you understand a conditional you know how to negate it. Journal of Cognitive Psychology. 24,3,329-334.pdf
Byrne, R.M.J., Carson, R., & Hannigan, B. (2012). Celebrating fifty years of psychology at Trinity College Dublin: A special issue of the Irish Journal of Psychology, 33, 2-3, pp 156.
2011
Dixon, J. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2011) Counterfactual thinking about exceptional actions. Memory & Cognition. 39 (7) 1317-1331.pdf
Pighin, S, Byrne, R.M.J., Ferrante, D., Gonzalez, M. & Girotto, V. (2011). Counterfactual thoughts about experienced, observed, and narrated events. Thinking and Reasoning, 17 (2) 197-211.54.pdf
Byrne, R.M.J. (2011) Counterfactual and causal thoughts about exceptional events. In Hoerl, C., McCormack, T., & Beck, E. (eds). Understanding counterfactuals, understanding causation. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 208-229.
2010
Byrne, R.M.J. & Johnson-Laird, P.N. (2010). Models Redux. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 14, 6.pdf
McCloy, R.A., Byrne, R.M.J. & Johnson-Laird, P.N. (2010). Understanding cumulative risk. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 63, 499-515 pdf
Byrne, R.M.J. and Johnson-Laird, P.N. (2010) Conditional and possibilities. In Oaksford, M., & Chater, N. (eds), Cognition and conditionals, Oxford University Press. pp 55-68.
2009
Byrne, R.M.J. & Johnson-Laird, P.N. (2009). ‘If’ and the problems of conditional reasoning. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 13, 282-287 pdf
Espino, O., Santamaria, C. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2009). People think about what is true for conditionals, not what is false: Only true possibilities prime the comprehension of ‘if’. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 62, 1072-1078 pdf
Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J., and Girotto, V. (2009) The mental model theory of conditionals. Topoi– An International Review of Philosophy, 28(1), 75-80. pdf
Egan, S., Garcia-Madruga, J. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2009). Indicative and counterfactual ‘only if’ conditionals. Acta Psychologica. 132, (3), 240-249 pdf
Dixon, J. E., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2009). If only counterfactuals and the exceptionality effect. In N.A. Taatgen & H. van Rijn (Eds.), Proceedings of the 31th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society (pp.2860-2865). Austin, TX: Cognitive Science Society.pdf
Byrne, R.M.J. & Girotto, V. (2009). ‘Cognitive processes in counterfactual thinking’ In K. Markman, W. Klein & E. Suhr (eds), Handbook of imagination and mental simulation Hove, Psychology Press. Pp. 151-160.
2008
Moreno-Rios, S., Garcia-Madruga, J. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2008). Semifactual ‘even if’ reasoning, Acta Psychologica, 128, 197 – 209 pdf
2007
Byrne, R.M.J., (2007). Precis of The Rational Imagination: How People Create Alternatives to Reality. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 2007, 439 – 453 pdf
Byrne, R.M.J., (2007). The rational imagination and other possibilities: Author’s response, Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 30, 2007, 470 – 480 pdf
Walsh, C.R. and Byrne, R.M.J., (2007). The effects of reasons for acting on counterfactual thinking., Thinking and Reasoning, 13, 461 – 483 pdf
Byrne, R.M.J. (2007). Whether, although and other conditional connectives’ in, editor(s) W. Schaeken, Vandierendonck, A., Schroyens, W., and d’Ydewalle, G. , The Mental Models Theory of Reasoning: Refinements and Extensions, Mahwah: New Jersey, Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp53 – 62.
2006
McEleney, A. and Byrne, R.M.J. (2006). Spontaneous causal and counterfactual thoughts.Thinking and Reasoning. 12, 235-255 pdf
Egan, S.E. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2006). Counterfactual promises and threats. In Proceedings of the 28th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society . Hillsdale: Erlbaum pp. 1257-1262.pdf
2005
Byrne, R.M.J. (2005). The rational imagination: how people create alternatives to reality.Cambridge, M.A.: MIT Press. pp 254.
Santamaria, C., Espino, O. and Byrne, R.M.J. (2005). Counterfactual and semifactual conditionals prime alternative possibilities. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory and Cognition. 31, 1149 – 1154 pdf
Cowley, M. & Byrne, R. M. J. (2005). When Falsification is the Only Path to Truth. In B. G. Bara, L. Barsalou, & M. Bucciarelli (eds.). Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. pp. 512-517. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. pdf
Meehan, J.E. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2005). Children’s counterfactual thinking: The temporal order effect. In B.G. Bara, L. Barsalou & M. Bucciarelli (Eds.), Proceedings of the 27th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates pp. 1467-1473. pdf
Murray, M.A. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2005). Attention and working memory in insight problem solving. In B. G. Bara, L. Barsalou, & M. Bucciarelli (eds.). Proceedings of the Twenty- Seventh Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. pp. p.1571- 1576. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. pdf
Walsh, C.R. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2005). The mental representation of what might have been. In D. R. Mandel, D. J. Hilton, & P. Catellani (Eds.) The psychology of counterfactual thinking. London : Routledge.
Byrne, R. M. J. & Walsh C.R. (2005). Resolving Contradictions. In V. Girotto & P.N. Johnson-Laird, (Eds.). The shape of reason: essays in honour of Paolo Legrenzi. Hove: Psychology Press.
2004
Walsh, C.R. and Byrne, R.M.J. (2004). Counterfactual thinking: the temporal order effect.Memory & Cognition, 32, 369-378. pdf
Byrne, R.M.J. & Egan, S.M. (2004). Counterfactual and Prefactual Conditionals. Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 58, 113-120 pdf
Cowley, M., & Byrne, R. M. J. (2004). Chess Masters’ Hypothesis Testing. In K. D.Forbus, D. Gentner, & T. Rogers (Eds.). Proceedings of the Twenty- Sixth Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. pp. 250- 255. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. pdf
2003
Quelhas, A. C. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2003). Reasoning with deontic and counterfactual conditionals. Thinking and Reasoning, 9, 43 -66. pdf
2002
Byrne, R.M.J. (2002). Mental models and counterfactual thinking. Trends in Cognitive Sciences. 6, 405-445. pdf
Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (2002) Conditionals: a theory of meaning, pragmatics, and inference. Psychological Review. 109, 646-678. pdf
Segura, S. Fernandez-Berrocal, P. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2002). Temporal and causal order effects in counterfactual thinking. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 55, 1295-1305. pdf
Thompson, V. and Byrne, R.M.J. (2002). Reasoning Counterfactually: Making inferences about things that didn’t happen. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition. 28, 1154-1170.pdf
McCloy R. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2002). Semifactual “even if” thinking. Thinking & Reasoning, 8, 41-67. pdf
Byrne, R.M.J. & Walsh, C.R. (2002). Contradictions and counterfactuals: Generating belief revisions in conditional inference. In Proceedings of the 24th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.pdf
2001
Walsh, C.R. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2001). A computational model of counterfactual thinking: The temporal order effect. In J.D. Moore & K. Stenning (Eds.) Proceedings of the 23rd Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 1078 – 1083. pdf
Espino, O. Santamaria, C. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2001). Supresion de inferencias en condicionales. In Fernandez Berrocal, P. and Santamaria, C. (Eds). Manual practico de psicologia del pensamiento. (Pp. 37-49). Barcelona: Ariel.
2000
Byrne, R.M.J. & McEleney, A. (2000) Counterfactual thinking about actions and failures to act. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 26, 1318- 1331.pdf
Byrne, R.M.J., Segura, S., Culhane, R., Tasso, A., & Berrocal, P. (2000) The temporality effect in counterfactual thinking about what might have been. Memory & Cognition, 28, 264- 281.pdf
McCloy, R. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2000) Counterfactual thinking about controllable actions.Memory & Cognition, 28, 1071-1078.pdf
Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (2000). Mental models and pragmatics. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 23, 284-285.
Byrne, R.M.J., and McEleney, A. (2000). Effetto dell’azione nel pensiero controfattuale: una teoria basata sui modelli mentali. In Cherubini, P., Giaretta, Pierdaniele, Mazzocco, A. (Eds). Ragionamento: Psicologia e logica. (pp 283-291.) Firenze: Giunti.
McEleney, A. & Byrne, R. M. J. (2000). Counterfactual thinking and causal explanation. In García-Madruga, J., Carriedo, N. & González-Labra, M. J.. Mental Models in Reasoning. (pp. 301-314). Madrid: UNED.
Quelhas, C. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2000). Latencies to understand and reasoning from counterfactual conditionals. In J. A. Garcia Madruga (Ed). Mental models and reasoning. (pp 315-326). Madrid: UNED.
Segura, S., Berrocal, P. & Byrne, R.M.J. (2000). Temporal and causal relations in counterfactual thinking. In J. A. Garcia Madruga (Ed). Mental models and reasoning. . (pp 327-336) Madrid: UNED
1999
Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1999). Models rule ok? A reply to Fetzer. Minds and Machines, 9, 111-118.
Byrne, R.M.J. & Tasso, A. (1999). Deductive reasoning with factual, possible, and counterfactual conditionals. Memory & Cognition. 27, 726-740.
Byrne, R.M.J., Espino, O. & Santamaria, C. (1999). Counterexamples and the suppression of inferences. Journal of Memory & Language, 40, 347-373.
McEleney, A. & Byrne, R. M. J. (1999). Consequences of counterfactual reasoning and causal reasoning. In Bagnara, S. (Ed.), European Conference on Cognitive Science ’99 (pp. 199-205). Siena, Italy:University of Siena.
Byrne, R.M.J., Espino, O. & Santamaria, C. (1999). Counterexample availability. In W. Schaeken, G. De Vooght, A. Vandierendonck & G. d’Ydewalle (Eds.). Deductive reasoning and strategies Hillsdale: Erlbaum. p. 97-110.
McCloy, R. & Byrne, R.M.J. (1999). Thinking about what might have been: if only, even if, causality and emotions. In N. Hahn & S.C. Stoness (Eds.), Proceedings of the 21st Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society . Hillsdale: Erlbaum.
McEleney, A. & Byrne, R.M.J. (1998). Counterfactual thinking and causal explanation. In J.Dunnion, G. O’Hare, S. O’Nuaillain, R. Reilly & B. Smyth (Eds). AI and Cognitive Science ’98. London: Springer-Verlag.
1998
Byrne, R.M.J. (1998). Spatial mental models in counterfactual thinking about what might have been. Kognitionswissenschaft, 7, 19-26.
Byrne, R.M.J., Espino, O. & Santamaria, C. (1998). Context suppresses inferences. Analise Psicologica , 210-214.
McCloy, R.A. & Byrne, R.M.J. (1998). Thinking about what might have been different and what might have been the same. In J. Dunnion, G. O’Hare, S. O’Nuaillain, R. Reilly & B. Smyth (Eds). AI and Cognitive Science ’98. London: Springer-Verlag.
Byrne, R.M.J., Tasso, A. and Thompson, V. (1998). Cognitive processes in Counterfactual Conditionals. In K. Korta, E. Sosa and X. Arrazola (Eds.) Cognition, Agency, and Rationality: Proceedings of the Fifth International Colloquium on Cognitive Science. Nertherlands: Kluwer. pp 113-129.
Segura, S., Fernandez-Berrocal, P., & Byrne, R. M. J. (1998). Razonamiento contrafactual: la posición serial y el número de antecedentes en los pensamientos sobre lo que podría haber sido. In D. Valiña, & M. J. Blanco (Eds.), I Jornadas de Psicologia del Pensamiento (pp. 179-187). Santiago de Compostela: Universidad de Santiago de Compostela.
1997
Byrne, R.M.J. (1997). Cognitive processes in counterfactual thinking about what might have been. The Psychology of Learning and Motivation, Advances in Research and Theory. Vol 37. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. pp. 105-154.
Byrne, R.M.J. and Handley, S.J. (1997). Reasoning strategies for suppositional deductions. Cognition, 62, 1-49.
Byrne, R.M.J., and McEleney, A. (1997). Cognitive processes in regret for actions and inactions. In M. Shafto & P. Langley (Eds.) Proceedings of the 19th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society . Hillsdale: Erlbaum. pp 73-78.
Byrne, R.M.J. (1997). The coming of age of the psychology of thinking and reasoning. In R.Fuller, P. Noonan Walsh, & P. McGinley. (Eds). A Century of Psychology. London: Routledge. pp. 207-223.
1996
Johnson-Laird, P.N., and Byrne, R.M.J. (1996). Mental models and syllogisms. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 19, 543 – 546.
Byrne, R.M.J. (1996). Towards a model theory of imaginary thinking. In J. Oakhill and A.Garnham (Eds.) Mental Models in Cognitive Science: Essays in honour of Phil Johnson-Laird. Hove, UK: Erlbaum, Taylor & Francis. pp. 155-174.
1995
Johnson-Laird, P.N., and Byrne, R.M.J. (1995). A model point of view. Thinking and Reasoning, 1, 339-350.
Byrne, R.M.J., Handley, S.J., and Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1995). Reasoning with suppositions.Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology. 48A, 915-944.
Schaeken, W., Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J., d’Ydewalle, G. (1995). A comparison of conditional and disjunctive inferences: a case study of the mental model theory of reasoning. Psychologica Belgica. 35, 57-70.
Byrne, R.M.J., Culhane, R., and Tasso, A. (1995). The temporality effect in thinking about what might have been. In J.D. Moore and J.F. Lehman (Eds.) Proceedings of the 17th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society . Hillsdale: Erlbaum.pp. 385-390.
1994
Johnson-Laird, P.N., and Byrne, R.M.J. (1994). Models, necessity, and the search for counterexamples. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 17, 775-777.
Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J., and Schaeken, W. (1994). Why models rather than rules give a better account of propositional reasoning: a reply to Bonatti, and to O’Brien, Braine, and Yang. Psychological Review, 101, 734-739.
Byrne, R.M.J. (1994). Deductive reasoning. In R.J. Sternberg (Ed.) Encyclopedia of Intelligence.New York: MacMillan.
Byrne, R.M.J. and Tasso, A. (1994). Counterfactual Reasoning: Inferences from hypothetical conditionals. In Ram, A. and Eiselt, K. (Eds). Proceedings of the 16th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society . Hillsdale: Erlbaum. pp. 124-129.
Keane, M.T., Cunningham, P., Brady, M. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1994). AICS’94. Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Irish Conference on Artificial Intelligence and Cognitive Science. Dublin: Dublin University Press. pp 246.
1993
Evans, J.St.B.T., Newstead, S. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1993). Human Reasoning: The Psychology of Deduction. Hove, UK, and Hillsdale, NJ:Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. pp 310.
Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1993). Mental models or formal rules? Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16, 368-380.
Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1993). Precis of Deduction. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 16, 323-333.
Byrne, R.M.J., and Handley, S. (1993). The nature and development of meta-deductive reasoning strategies. In K. Ryan and R.F.E. Sutcliffe (Eds). AI and Cognitive Science ’92. London: Springer-Verlag. pp. 59-70.
Byrne, R.M.J., Johnson-Laird, P.N., and Handley, S. (1993). Who’s telling the truth…Cognitive processes in meta-deductions. In H. Sorenson (Ed). AI and Cognitive Science ’91. London: Springer-Verlag, pp. 221-233.
Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1993). Models and deductive rationality. In Manktelow,K.I. and Over, D.E. (Eds.) Rationality: Psychological and philosophical perspectives.London: Routledge. pps. 177-210.
1992
Byrne, R.M.J. and Handley, S.J. (1992). Reasoning Strategies. Irish Journal of Psychology:Trinity 400 Special Issue, 13, 111-124.
Byrne, R.M.J. and Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1992). The spontaneous use of propositional connectives. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 45A, 89-110.
Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1992). Modal reasoning, models, and Manktelow and Over. Cognition. 43, 173-182.
Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J., and Schaeken, W. (1992). Propositional reasoning by model. Psychological Review, 99, 418-439.
Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J., and Tabossi, P. (1992). In defense of reasoning: A reply to Greene. Psychological Review, 99, 188-190.
Byrne, R.M.J. (1992). The model theory of deduction. In Rogers, Y, Rutherford, A. and Bibby, P.(Eds.) Models in the Mind: Theory, Perspective, and Applications. London: Academic Press. pp. 11 – 28.
Byrne, R.M.J., Handley, S., and Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1992). Advances in the Psychology of Reasoning: Meta-deduction. In Keane, M. T. and Gilhooly, K. (Eds.) Advances in the Psychology of Thinking, Vol. 1. London: Harvester Wheatsheaf. pp. 127-145.
1991
Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1991). Deduction. Hove, UK, and Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. pp 243.
Byrne, R.M.J. (1991). Can valid inferences be suppressed? Cognition, 39, 71-78.
Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1991). Modelos mentales en el razonamiento deductivo. Revista de Occidente, 119, 85-111. Trans F. Torres Oliver.
Byrne, R.M.J. (1991). The construction of explanations. In McTear, M.and Creaney, N. (Eds.) AI and Cognitive Science ’90. London: Springer-Verlag.
1990
Johnson-Laird, P.N. & Byrne, R.M.J. (1990). Meta-logical problems: knights, knaves, and Rips. Cognition, 36, 69-84.
Byrne, R.M.J. (1990). Mental models. In Eysenck, M. (Ed.) Dictionary of Cognitive Psychology. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Byrne, R.M.J. and Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1990). Models and deductive reasoning. In Gilhooly, K.J., Keane, M.T.G, Logie, R.H., & Erdos, G. (Eds.) Lines of Thinking: Reflections on the Psychology of Thought. Volume 1: Representation, Reasoning, Analogy, and Decision Making. pp. 139-152. London: Wiley.
Byrne, R.M.J. & Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1990). Remembering conclusions we have inferred: what biases reveal. In J.-P. Caverni, J.-M. Fabre, & M. Gonzalez (Eds.) Cognitive Biases: Their Contribution for Understanding Human Cognitive Processes. pp. 109-120. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Johnson-Laird, P.N. & Byrne, R.M.J. (1990). Mental models. In H. Yoshikawa and T. Holden (Eds.) Proceedings of the IFIP WG 5.2 Second Workshop on CAD.pp. 3 – 15. CAD, Cambridge.
1989
Byrne, R.M.J. (1989). Suppressing valid inferences with conditionals. Cognition, 31,61-83. pdf
Byrne, R.M.J. (1989). Everyday reasoning with conditional sequences. Quarterly Journal of Experimental Psychology, 41A, 141-166.pdf
Byrne, R.M.J. and Johnson-Laird, P.N. (1989). Spatial reasoning.Journal of Memory and Language, 28, 564-575.pdf
Byrne, R.M.J. (1989). Human deductive reasoning. Cognitive Science: Special Issue of the Irish Journal of Psychology, 10, 216-231.
Byrne, R.M.J. and Keane, M.T.G. (1989). Cognitive Science: A Special Issue of the Irish Journal of Psychology. Dublin: Psychological Society of Ireland. pp 352.
Johnson-Laird, P.N. and Byrne, R.M.J. (1989). Only reasoning.Journal of Memory and Language, 28, 313-330. pdf
Johnson-Laird, P.N., Byrne, R.M.J., and Tabossi, P. (1989). Reasoning by model: the case of multiple quantification. Psychological Review, 96, 658-673.pdf
Reasoning and Imagination Lab 